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RULE 4(K), NATIONWIDE PERSONAL
JURISDICTION, AND THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE: LESSONS FROM ATTEMPTED
REFORM
A. Benjamin Spencer∗
INTRODUCTION
On multiple occasions, I have advocated for a revision to Rule 4(k) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would disconnect personal jurisdiction in
federal courts from the jurisdictional limits of their respective host states—to
no avail. In this Essay, I will review—one final time—my argument for
nationwide personal jurisdiction in the federal courts, recount my (failed)
attempt to persuade the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to embrace my
view, and reflect on what lessons may be drawn from the experience regarding
the civil rulemaking process. My aim is to prompt discussion around potential
rulemaking reforms and to equip future would-be reformers with insights that
might facilitate some degree of success.
I. THE PROPOSAL: NATIONWIDE PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In most cases, personal jurisdiction over defendants in federal court is
limited to the jurisdictional reach enjoyed by the courts of the state in which
the federal district court is located.1 This is a consequence of Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
which provides that “[s]erving a summons or filing a waiver of service
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court
is located.”2 Importantly, this limitation is not a consequence of constitutional
limits on the authority of federal courts; as arms of the national sovereign, they
are limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment3—not the
Fourteenth Amendment—and thus the constitutional scope of a federal court’s

∗ Dean & M-W Foundation Trustee Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. The author is
also a member of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States; the
views expressed in this Essay are his own and do not represent official views of the Rules Committee.
1. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)) (“Federal courts
ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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territorial jurisdiction extends nationally, requiring only minimum contacts with
the United States as a whole.4
Notwithstanding the constitutional scope of federal territorial jurisdiction,
the longstanding approach has been to constrain the reach of the federal courts
to a smaller territorial sphere—initially to the district inhabited or occupied by
the defendant5 and today to the territorial reach of courts of the respective host
states. This approach was sound initially, both doctrinally and from a policy
perspective. Doctrinally, as an emanation from the Judiciary Act of 1789,
limiting the effective reach of process was a proper exercise of Congress’s
authority to create and regulate inferior federal courts.6 Policy wise, as a
geographically dispersed nation comprised of a union of previously separate
colonies, limiting the ability of federal courts to summon persons from one
state to another (by horse-driven means) likely was the only approach that was
tenable if the federal courts were to exist at all.
Today’s limitation, however, is of a different character in a couple of
important respects. The territorial reach of the federal district courts is limited
by a rule of civil procedure rather than by statute, and it is styled as a
jurisdictional rule rather than a rule that constrains the reach of process.7 The
statute under which the Federal Rules are promulgated—the Rules Enabling Act
(REA)8—only authorizes the development of rules of “practice and procedure”
4. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion) (“Because the
United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States but not of any particular State.”); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (“The only difference in the personal-jurisdiction analysis under the two Amendments is the scope of
relevant contacts: Under the Fourteenth Amendment, which defines the reach of state courts, the relevant
contacts are state-specific. Under the Fifth Amendment, which defines the reach of federal courts, contacts
with the United States as a whole are relevant.”); Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d
935, 946–47 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] defendant’s contacts with the forum state play no magical role in the Fifth
Amendment analysis. . . . Thus, determining whether litigation imposes an undue burden on a litigant cannot
be determined by evaluating only a defendant’s contacts with the forum state. A court must therefore examine
a defendant’s aggregate contacts with the nation as a whole rather than his contacts with the forum state in
conducting the Fifth Amendment analysis.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. De Ortiz, 910 F.2d 376,
382 (7th Cir. 1990) (indicating that Fifth Amendment due process is satisfied where the defendant has
“sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole rather than any particular state or other geographic
area”).
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (“[N]o civil suit shall be brought before [district or
circuit] courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ . . . .”) amended by
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. III, § 1.
7. As originally adopted in 1938, Rule 4(f)—the predecessor to Rule 4(k)(1)(A)—confined itself to
addressing the geographical reach of effective service of process; it read:
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. All process other than a subpoena may be served
anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a
statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. A subpoena
may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (1938). This, of course, is not how Rule 4(k)(1)(A) reads today. Id. 4(k)(1)(A) (indicating
when service of process “establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant”).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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(or evidence), not jurisdictional rules, which are what we find in Rule
4(k)(1)(A).9 Additionally, the policy justification for confining the reach of
federal district courts to the limits of their respective host states no longer holds.
Today, federal courts are well-established forums for disputes that cross state
lines or touch on topics of national concern, and they should be available to
hear such cases, especially when the doors to state court would be closed.10
Further, the advent of a minimum contacts approach to personal jurisdiction
that focuses on purposeful contacts rather than physical presence,11 combined
with the minimization of inconvenience that modern communications and
transportation technology provide,12 have made it unnecessary to view state
boundaries as the relevant touchpoints for the disputes that federal courts
entertain. Indeed, doing so presents dubious outcomes, as federal court litigants
must frequently tarry over jurisdictional fights of no (Fifth Amendment)
constitutional significance,13 and defendants evade the grasp of federal courts
for no good reason other than that their co-located state cousins would be
impotent under the same circumstances.14
In any event, these perspectives led me to develop and suggest the
following proposal to amend Rule 4(k):
(k) TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. (1) In General.
Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant: when exercising jurisdiction is consistent with

9. A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA L. REV. 654, 711–13
(2019) (laying out argument extensively).
10. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 FLA. L. REV. 979, 986 (2019)
(“[S]hackling federal courts to the territorial limits of their host states deprives them of the ability to fulfill a
key role as providers of an important forum for qualifying civil disputes when state courts are unavailable.”
(citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 235 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndeed to
put [the question of personal jurisdiction in federal court] in the hands of the states would be to destroy all
reason for having a federal tribunal (in which the litigant has more confidence) enforce a litigant’s rights
accorded by state law.”))).
11. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945).
12. See, e.g., Kernan v. Kurz–Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that burden on
Japanese defendant was insufficient to overcome its minimum contacts, particularly because “the
conveniences of modern communication and transportation ease what would have been a serious burden
only a few decades ago”); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998) (“‘[I]n this
era of fax machines and discount air travel’ requiring [the defendant] to litigate in [a foreign jurisdiction] is
not constitutionally unreasonable.” (quoting Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 622 (C.D.
Cal. 1996))).
13. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 990–91 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction doctrine with respect to the
Fourteenth Amendment ‘is notoriously confusing and imprecise’; the linkage mandated by Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
needlessly hobbles federal courts and litigants—in ordinary cases as well as in consolidated multidistrict
proceedings—with having to perpetuate and endure expensive, wasteful, and time-consuming satellite
litigation over jurisdictional disputes that would largely be obviated under a regime governed solely (or
primarily) by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (footnotes omitted)).
14. See id. at 989–90 (discussing cases in which defendants evade the jurisdictional reach of federal
courts based on state jurisdictional limitations under circumstances in which the Fifth Amendment would
not have precluded jurisdiction in federal court).
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the United States Constitution and laws [deleting the remainder of the present
rule].15

Revising Rule 4(k) in this manner would leave the matter of personal
jurisdiction in the federal district courts to be governed solely by the Fifth
Amendment, subject to any laws Congress might subsequently enact. That
would mean that minimum contacts with the United States would suffice for
jurisdictional purposes, which all U.S.-based persons and entities would satisfy
based on general jurisdiction; otherwise, defendants’ nationwide contacts,
rather than their contacts with the forum state, would be assessed for
constitutional sufficiency. Federal venue laws16 would remain as a means of
steering disputes into appropriate geographical locales.
II. RULES COMMITTEE RESPONSE: A POLITE NO THANK YOU
My proposal (along with that of Professor Patrick Borchers to expand Rule
4(k)(2)’s coverage to diversity cases)17 was placed on the agenda for the April
2018 meeting of the Rules Committee. As is customary, the Reporter to the
Committee, Professor Ed Cooper, crafted a “Reporter’s Memorandum” that
addressed my proposal by presenting a summary and analysis of it.18 After aptly
summarizing my proposal, its purported benefits, and the acknowledged
implications for the jurisdictional reach of federal courts, Professor Cooper
noted a hesitancy that I expressed in my letter to the Committee: the
amendment I had proposed retained Rule 4(k)’s posture as a jurisdictional rule,
which—as noted above—I had concluded that the REA did not permit.
However, I did not believe that this view would be shared by the Rules
Committee, and thus my proposed language was offered using jurisdictional
language notwithstanding my REA argument pooh-poohing such an approach
from a doctrinal perspective (and proving that straddling the academic and
practical spheres simultaneously is tricky to pull off successfully).
Professor Cooper addressed my REA concerns by laying out a brief
argument as to why Rule 4(k)(1)(A), as currently written, was consistent with
the REA while leaving open to debate whether my proposal would be
consistent with the REA.19 That treatment left my proposal in the worst of both
15. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, AGENDA, APRIL 10, 2018, at 367 (2018) [hereinafter
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rulesAGENDA],
civil-procedure-april-2018. This language mirrors the approach taken in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7004(f). See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f).
16. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404, 1406.
17. AGENDA, supra note 15, at 347.
18. Id. at 335.
19. Id. at 339 (“Professor Spencer has moved to the view that the Enabling Act does not provide
authority to push personal jurisdiction to the outer limits he proposes. In short, past Committees have
concluded that the Enabling Act authorizes rules that expand personal jurisdiction by providing for service
of process outside the court’s district or state. The explicit ‘special note’ provided with the adoption of Rule
4(k)(2) lends support to the view that the Supreme Court was fully aware of these questions and agreed that
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worlds: potentially hobbled by my own REA argument but not bolstered by an
embrace of the REA-infirmity of the current rule that I was trying to supplant.
In other words, rather than my REA argument serving as an incentive for the
Rules Committee to walk away from Rule 4(k)(1)(A), it was being used against
me (admittedly at my own instigation) as an obstacle to considering my
proposed reform. My first error, then, was to infuse a largely academic and
debatable proposition—that the Rules Enabling Act could not sustain a rule
such as Rule 4(k)(1)(A)—into the discussion, for it distracted and detracted
from my principal objective of achieving jurisdictional reform.20
The REA authority conundrum was simply the first course served in
Professor Cooper’s tripartite presentation of the difficulties that would
accompany any embrace of what I was suggesting. His next observation was
that one would have to be attentive to how choice of law would work in a world
in which federal courts could entertain disputes that their host states could not.
This is because under Klaxon, federal courts adjudicating state law claims are
bound to apply the host state’s choice-of-law rules,21 a linkage that becomes
attenuated if not entirely severed if diversity and alienage cases are litigated in
states whose courts would lack jurisdiction over them. As Professor Cooper
mused, federal courts potentially unbound from Klaxon would have to develop

these rules satisfy both requirements of § 2072: They really are rules of procedure, and they do not abridge,
enlarge, or modify the underlying substantive rights.”).
20. Showing that I cannot let go of the point, for those who think that the rule is a procedural one
because it purports to govern the territorial limits of effective service, I simply point out that the jurisdictional
constraints imposed on federal courts by Rule 4(k)(1)(A) are regularly operative outside of the Rule 4 service
of process context when amended claims adding new parties and the claims of intervenors and co-parties are
lodged and served under Rule 5, not Rule 4. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Out of the Quandary: Personal Jurisdiction
over Absent Class Member Claims Explained, 39 REV. LITIG. 31, 43 (2019) (“Once a defendant has appeared in a
case in response to the original service of the complaint, all subsequent pleadings are served on the defendant
under Rule 5(a)(1). This means, for example, that an amended pleading asserting new claims need not be reserved under Rule 4. There is no question that—notwithstanding that such amended complaints are not
served with a summons under Rule 4—new claims appearing in amended complaints must satisfy the
jurisdictional constraints imposed by Rule 4(k); courts regularly apply Rule 4(k)(1)(A) limitations to the claims
appearing in amended complaints.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 43–44 (“[W]hen a plaintiff amends its
complaint to add new plaintiffs under Rule 20, or when new plaintiffs intervene in an action under Rule 24,
neither of these parties is required to serve process on the defendant under Rule 4. Instead, their claims are
introduced in the action either through an amendment under Rule 15 (adding a plaintiff under Rule 20) or a
motion to intervene under Rule 24, both of which are communicated to the defendant under the auspices of
Rule 5, not Rule 4. Notwithstanding that, the personal jurisdiction limitations of the district court that are
imposed by Rule 4(k) remain the operative constraints that district courts apply to these new claims by newly
joined parties. It thus cannot be gainsaid that the territorial reach of federal courts over claims added to the
action after the initial service of the summons is defined by Rule 4(k), even though none of those claims are
served on defendants under Rule 4.” (footnotes omitted)).
21. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“We are of opinion that the
prohibition declared in Erie . . . against such independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the
field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform
to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”).
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an alternate means of selecting an appropriate choice-of-law rule, a matter the
Federal Rules might not be able to address consistent with the REA.22
Professor Cooper’s final and most effective parry was to articulate the
potential complexities of a regime wholly dependent on the venue statutes to
shoulder the task of infusing locational rationality in federal courts if possessed
of the national reach that my proposal would give them. He wondered, “If
§ 1391 was not drafted, and has not yet been interpreted, to do duty in a context
of nationwide minimum contacts jurisdiction, is it fair to rely on it to supply
appropriate locating factors?”23 He also rightly pointed out that because foreign
defendants receive little to no protection under the general venue statute,24 a
nationwide jurisdiction regime would leave them vulnerable to being dragged
into any federal district court in the country, no matter how unconnected its
locale might be from the dispute. Perhaps most damningly, Professor Cooper
explained that because the identification of an appropriate venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) is closely intertwined with where entity defendants could be
subjected to personal jurisdiction,25 revising Rule 4(k) to make jurisdiction
potentially available in every federal court could theoretically eviscerate any
limitation on where venue would be proper under (b)(1) as well.26 Ameliorating
this problem would be tremendously difficult, wrote Professor Cooper, because
it would require a congressional assist.27
At the April 2018 meeting of the Rules Committee, Professor Cooper gave
an oral recitation of the observations previewed in his Reporter’s
Memorandum,28 which I was then charged with following with remarks in
defense of my proposal. I laid out arguments that I later detailed in a 2019 article
that I prepared specifically to address Professor Cooper’s concerns,29 so I won’t
rehearse them here. In short, I waved off the choice-of-law concern as cabined
by due process constraints on applicable law but acknowledged that REA
authority issues and the need for “some tweaking” of the federal venue statutes
in tandem with any broadening of jurisdiction meant that the wisest course for
the Committee to pursue would be to take on the issue with the goal of
22. AGENDA, supra note 15, at 340 (“Whether Klaxon is viewed with satisfaction or despair, expanding
a federal court’s personal jurisdiction beyond the reach of local state courts raises troubling questions about
forcing adoption of local choice-of-law rules.”).
23. Id. at 342.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any
judicial district . . . .”).
25. See id. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(2) (providing that venue is proper where any defendant resides and defining
residency for entities as “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question”).
26. AGENDA, supra note 15, at 341 (“On the face of it, expanding Rule 4(k) to Fifth Amendment due
process limits seems to obliterate any independent venue provision for entity defendants.”).
27. Id. (“Attempting to adjust this question through a more complicated Rule 4(k) may prove difficult.
Adjusting it by amending § 1391 would require careful collaboration with Congress.”).
28. CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES, APRIL 10, 2018, at 26–30 (2018) [hereinafter MINUTES],
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-10-cv_minutes_final_0.pdf.
29. Spencer, supra note 10, at 1005–13.
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developing proposals for action by Congress.30 After further discussion—
which centered around the broad implications of expansion, whether it was
proper for the Committee to make suggestions to Congress, and lingering
concerns regarding authority under the REA—the Committee voted to carry
forward the topic on the agenda without closing it out.31 The matter has since
not reappeared on the Committee’s agenda and is unlikely to do so.
III. LESSONS
It is likely perilous to attempt generalizations regarding the rulemaking
process from this single experience. Thus, I will simply offer the lessons that I
am taking away from the occasion—informed by my overall experience as a
member of the Committee—with the hope that others with ideas for rule
reform can gain some insights that will increase their chance of success.
The power of the Reporter. First, the Reporters have a sizable influence on the
will of the Committee, particularly with respect to proposals that touch upon
matters with which members have had less experience. As most people are
aware, the Reporter to the Committee is no mere scrivener; rather, the Reporter
must be understood to be both the principal draftsman (yes, thus far the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee’s Reporters have all been men) for the Committee
and an advisor who provides trusted guidance to its members as they consider
what is brought before them. The Reporters are not voting members of the
Committee,32 and the Reporters whom I have known have honored that
limitation, declining to offer opinions for or against a particular proposal under
discussion. However, they do provide an analysis of every proposal, which
affords them the opportunity to comment on the degree to which the problem
addressed by the proposal is real or imagined, whether the proposal would be
effective at addressing the perceived problem, and what disruptive effect—if
any—the proposal would have on other aspects of the system were it to be
adopted. To the extent the Reporter indicates less confidence in the existence
or significance of a perceived problem, that view is likely to lead the Committee
toward a sense that there is no need to act. If the Reporter raises the prospect
of significant disruption and uncertainty that would result from adopting a
proposal—as was done with respect to my Rule 4(k) proposal—the Committee
is likely to be less inclined to move in that direction. This is not offered as a
criticism; it is merely an observation that warrants emphasis for those who
would seek to move a proposal through the Committee. My takeaway from this
insight has been to vet my ideas thoroughly with the Reporter well in advance
so that I can hear his reactions privately, respond to them, and adjust my
30. MINUTES, supra note 28, at 30–31.
31. Id. at 32.
32. See Committee Membership Selection, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/aboutrulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
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proposal accordingly. In this way, the proposal is strengthened, and it is spared
having the Committee members being exposed to the full range of commentary
that the Reporter would have shared had I not consulted him. I failed to take
this step with my Rule 4(k) proposal, and we saw where that led me.
The judicial perspective. A feature of the Committee that enhances the
influence of the Reporter is its membership that is derived mostly from the
judiciary. Rather than a committee of politicians, practicing lawyers, or
academics, the majority of the Committee’s members—including its chair—are
currently drawn from the federal bench (plus one jurist from a state court).33
Whereas academics, political appointees, or advocates might be slightly less
inclined to defer to the Reporter’s perspective, the jurists seem to have intense
regard for the word of the Reporter. That is a good thing, because the Reporter
is typically an unbiased and highly respected expert whose words should carry
weight. Although law professors, Justice Department officials, and attorneys
are capable of setting aside their own policy preferences when serving as
members of the committee, they inevitably are susceptible to being more (small
“p”) partisan and thus more willing to press forward notwithstanding
objections the Reporter might raise; jurists (at least those I’ve served with on
the Committee) tend to be more or less non-ideological in their orientation
towards matters that come before the Committee, with their greater degree of
neutrality providing more fertile ground for the Reporter’s detached
perspective.
Problem-solving, not policymaking orientation. In my estimation, the Committee
as currently constituted34 is a practically-oriented body focused on
superintending the civil rules system, making sure that the system is functioning
properly, and making adjustments when defects or inefficiencies are detected
or external forces necessitate reform. During my time on the Committee, its
33. This profile of the Committee dates from the 1970s, prior to which practitioners and academics
enjoyed the most representation on the committee. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court
Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1567–68 (2015) (“The data reflect
that in the early 1960s, practitioners enjoyed the highest level of representation, followed by academics, with
judges the least represented. A transformation followed in which, by the 1970s, judges moved from a relatively
small minority to a consistent majority on the Committee. Just as precipitous as judges’ ascent to majority
status was the corresponding decline in the share of Committee representation garnered by practitioners and
academics.”).
34. I recognize this description may not accurately characterize the Committee as previously
constituted, as many might critique the Committee for having endorsed value-laden reforms that arguably
preferenced certain interests in civil litigation. E.g., Brooke D. Coleman, #Sowhitemale: Federal Civil Rulemaking,
113 NW. U. L. REV. 52, 70–71 (2015) (“Almost every rule amendment reflects the Committee members’
normative judgment about what litigation values should be elevated. For example, the 1983 amendment to
Rule 11 provided for mandatory sanctions. That choice—to harden the sanction rule—was not simply a
technical tweak. It was a choice reflecting the Committee members’ normative judgment that the civil justice
system would be better served if more frivolous claims were filtered out earlier. . . . The recent proportionality
amendments are similarly value-laden. Rule 26(b)(1) was amended in 2015 to further restrict the scope of
discovery. . . . Again, the amendment was not the mere fine-tuning of a rule. . . . Committee members decided
to give primacy to their judgment that restrictive discovery is better for the civil justice system—even if that
means that some plaintiffs with valid claims will be unable to get the information they need to win their
cases.” (footnote omitted)).

SPENCER_RULE 4(K)_POST-SLUG (DO NOT DELETE)

616

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

3/30/2022 11:37 AM

[Vol. 73:3:607

focus has been on making tweaks that address identifiable problems. At my first
meeting in the fall of 2017, the Committee was considering revising Rule
30(b)(6) to address perceived difficulties that both those who represent
plaintiffs and those who represent defendants were reporting experiencing.35
With an acknowledgment that problems existed surrounding Rule 30(b)(6)
depositions, the Committee felt that it could do no more than revise the rule to
require that the parties “confer in good faith about the matters for examination”
in advance.36 Another topic on the Committee’s plate when I joined it in 2017
was the process for handling the review of denials of Social Security disability
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Because the Social Security Administration
(SSA) indicated that the lack of uniform procedures for such cases across the
federal districts presented it with significant inefficiencies, the Committee
ultimately accommodated the SSA’s request for a separate set of uniform
national procedural rules for such cases that acknowledged their summary
judgment or appellate-like nature.37 A final example of a context in which the
Committee has been willing to act is in response to the challenges posed by the
COVID-19 global pandemic, proposing a new Rule 87 that provides for
alterations to rules concerning service of process and certain time limits during
a declared “Civil Rules Emergency.”38
Each of the above represent adjustments or accommodations that attempt
to address an identifiable concern raised by practitioners and members of the
judiciary rather than reforms designed to alleviate policy-oriented perceived ills
or injustices. None of these changes threaten to be too disruptive in most cases
or to the system as a whole. Contrast these changes to the rules with what my
Rule 4 proposal portended: while the reforms noted above do not involve
fundamental change and will likely only have an impact—if any—on the
margins, adoption of my Rule 4(k) proposal would result in a sea-change in how
territorial jurisdiction in the federal courts would be handled, significantly
impacting the range of locales to which defendants could be called to litigate
claims against them. Further, although my proposal was motivated by what I
identified as a problem—that defendants could evade personal jurisdiction in
35.
CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES, NOVEMBER 7, 2017, at 2 (2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-11-7-_civil_rules_meeting_minutes_final_0.pdf
(“Examples of bad practice are presented by both sides. Plaintiffs encounter poorly prepared witnesses.
Defendants encounter uncertainty, vague requests, and overly broad and burdensome requests. All agree that
courts do not want to become involved with these problems.”).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) (amended Dec. 1, 2020).
37. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
3 (2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/civil_rules_report_-_may_2021_0.pdf. The
Supplemental Rules for Social Security Review Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) take effect on December 1,
2022. Pending Rules and Forms Amendments, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rulesand-forms-amendments (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
38. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., PRELIMINARY DRAFT: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL
RULES
OF
EVIDENCE
44–48
(2021),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/preliminary_draft_of_proposed_amendments_2021_0.pdf.
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federal court not based on any real constitutional concern or actual
inconvenience but merely because the co-located state courts could not exercise
jurisdiction over them—that is not the kind of problem the Committee is truly
designed to perceive and address.
This orientation may arise from the dominant judicial perspective on the
committee alluded to above, which tends to yield a seeming bias towards
institutional conservatism. The jurists on the committee are frequent, repeat
players in the civil justice drama, which gives them a useful perspective to
perceive instances where the system breaks down. But their perspective is
limited and tends to be oriented towards the types of snags that undermine the
efficient processing of matters to some sort of resolution, as opposed to
concerning themselves with the more fundamental and global implications of
the rules on the regulatory and remedial goals of the civil justice system.
CONCLUSION
I confess that it is unlikely that this simple case study on the fate of a single
proposal can yield meaningful generalizations about the current civil rulemaking
process. Although I have identified a few lessons that I have drawn from the
experience, I am happy to hear from others involved regarding what their
takeaways might have been. I, for one, have taken these lessons to heart,
crafting a follow-on proposal (on another topic) and accompanying Committee
strategy accordingly. I have developed a proposal to amend Rule 9(b) to
overcome the unfortunate misreading of that provision by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.39 This time around, I shared the proposal with the Committee
Reporter, Professor Cooper, when it was under development and adjusted my
arguments accordingly. Then, I thoroughly explained my proposal in an article
that I published40 and then circulated to the Committee, whereas previously I
led with my Rule 4(k) proposal and followed up with a detailed defense of it in
an article41 only after it had already been tabled by the Committee. Importantly,
in my piece articulating the rationale for amending Rule 9(b) as I have proposed,
I focused a great deal of attention on the problem that the Iqbal interpretation
of Rule 9(b) was causing in the lower courts, creating meaningful dissensus on
the proper pleading obligations under the rule and imposing inordinate and
inappropriate burdens on litigants that were never intended by the rule. In the
piece, I offered textualist, originalist, and policy-based arguments as well,
although it is unclear whether any of these will have any sway. After previewing
the proposal with another member of the Committee, who encouraged me to

39. See 556 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2009).
40. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Conditions of the Mind Under Rule 9(b): Repairing the Damage Wrought by
Iqbal, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015 (2020).
41. Spencer, supra note 10.
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submit it, I formally submitted the Rule 9(b) proposal for consideration in
August of 2020.42
This time, my proposal received a much more hospitable reception by
Reporter Ed Cooper. Because I had led with the article articulating the rationale
for the proposal and submitted it with the proposal, Professor Cooper’s memo
to the Committee was able to—and did—draw heavily from the arguments that
I had laid out.43 This is not to say that Professor Cooper embraced the proposal;
as mentioned above, that is not the Reporter’s role. Rather, he outlined many
fewer challenges and complexities that arose from my Rule 9(b) proposal than
he had with my Rule 4(k) proposal; I’d like to think that was achieved by my
benefiting from hearing his perspective privately during the proposalformulation process (but that could be wishful thinking, revisionist history, or
both). In any event, rather than tabling the Rule 9(b) proposal indefinitely, the
Committee agreed to carry the proposal forward to the April 2021 meeting. The
proposal was discussed further at that meeting, with a sense reached that “the
proposal is worthy of serious study” and that “[t]here are concerns that need to
be addressed.”44 The discussion ended with an agreement that “[i]t may prove
desirable to appoint a subcommittee to study Rule 9(b).”45 At the October 2021
meeting of the Committee, the Chair announced that a Rule 9(b) subcommittee
would indeed be appointed.46
I offer all of this to say that I made an effort to learn from the unsuccessful
experience with my Rule 4(k) proposal to develop a more successful strategy
for my Rule 9(b) proposal. Consulting with the Reporter in advance and
focusing largely on tangible problems with the status quo that a proposal will
ameliorate seem to be two important keys to getting some consideration. I
hesitate to add, however, that proposals that promise smaller, less disruptive
changes might have more legs, and my Rule 9(b) proposal does not purport to
be nondisruptive. That ultimately could prove to be a real obstacle to its
adoption, particularly as it pushes against the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
a rule, something the Committee has shown that it is loath to do (see its deadend discussion of whether to amend Rule 8 to overturn Twombly).

42. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, AGENDA, OCTOBER 16, 2020, at 265 (2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10_civil_rules_agenda_book_final.pdf.
43. See id. at 260–61.
44.
CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES, APRIL 23, 2021, at 30 (2021),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/minutes_from_advisory_committee_on_civil_rules_meeting
_april_23_2021_0.pdf; see also id. (observing that “this topic is ‘incredibly important, and deserves close
attention’”).
45. Id.
46.
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, AGENDA, OCTOBER 5, 2021, at 259 (2021),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10-05_civil_rules_agenda_book_final_1.pdf. At the
time of publication, it was uncertain whether the Committee would proceed with undertaking any Rule 9(b)
reform, although preliminary indications are that a majority of the subcommittee is not inclined to move
forward after having considered the proposal.
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I will hazard to offer a couple of suggestions for reform that might help the
Committee become more amenable to policy-oriented changes to the rules (on
the dubious assumption that moving in that direction would be a good thing).
First, the Committee might benefit from having fewer judges as members.
I do not have great suggestions for how that goal could be achieved, particularly
if we cannot have confidence that a committee with a larger proportion of
lawyers, academics, or both, would be an improvement. But perhaps just some
minor tweaking to the Committee composition, dropping a couple of jurists
and bringing in a couple of additional lawyers and perhaps another academic,
could leaven some of the judicial bias that currently holds sway.
Second, it might be helpful if the Chief Justice provided more guidance
regarding his vision for the Committee, perhaps even going so far as to provide
it with a charge to consider and address more policy-oriented, systemic
concerns. That is certain not to happen with the incumbent Chief and is unlikely
to be welcomed from any future Chiefs. And I can easily imagine that this
suggestion could fall into the be-careful-what-you-wish-for category. My point
here, however, is simply to suggest that some type of nod or indication from
the Chief to the Committee that its mandate was greater than tinkering and
repair but a more comprehensive consideration of the impact of the rules on
yielding just outcomes could give Committee members a sense that they were
more empowered to do bigger things in their role.
Finally, it would not hurt to make the Committee more inclusive in the
perspectives and backgrounds that it represents. Studies have shown that white,
Republican-appointed judges have been overrepresented and have a much
higher likelihood of being appointed to the Committee.47 Certainly, meritorious
Committee service could be had from other sectors of the population, who
might incidentally carry with them greater amenability to systemic, policyoriented reform.
My time on the Committee is coming to a close soon. But before I leave
and after, I hope to put forward one or two additional proposals for rule reform.
As for my hopes of seeing Rule 4(k) revised, I’ve let those go, but I am

47. Professor Brooke Coleman explores the lack of diversity among Committee membership.
Coleman, supra note 34, at 53 (“Of the 136 individuals who have served on the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee since its inception, 116 are white men, fifteen are white women, and five are men of color. . . . [I]n
the roughly eighty years of the Civil Rules Committee’s existence, the gender and racial identity of Committee
members has remained static.”); see also Burbank & Farhang, supra note 33, at 1574 (“The race variable is
significant and negative, indicating that non-white judges are less likely to serve on the Advisory Committee.
By comparison, white judges’ probability of serving on the committee is about 5.1 times larger. Examining
the raw data to assess the plausibility of this very large effect, we observe that although non-white judges
account for 11 percent of the judge-years in the data, they account for only 2 percent of committee serviceyears (6 of 277), and 2 percent of appointments or reappointments (2 of 103).”); id. (“[C]ontrolling for the
composition of the federal bench, Republican-appointed judges had more than double the estimated
probability of serving on the Committee during the period of interest. . . . The probability of service for
judges appointed by Republican presidents is 2.3 times larger, or 130 percent higher, than for Democratic
appointees.”).
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appreciative of what the experience of trying to get that rule changed has taught
me about how to pursue effective reform going forward.

